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Abstract. We estimate and make population forecasts with Foley’s (2000) model in three 
different ways. The population forecasts for high, middle and low-income countries are quite 
good and suggest that the omitted variable bias from its simplicity is small. Estimation of the 
model as a system shows that indeed Malthusian behaviour - defined as increasing population 
growth through increasing per capita income - cannot be found for any of the income groups 
of the Worldbank classification nor for Sub-Saharan Africa, and also not for countries with 
per capita income below $1200 in a panel estimate. For world aggregate data and for the low-
income countries we find increasing returns to scale, but for the other groups decreasing 
returns (outweighed by a positive time trend except for Sub-Saharan Africa and the u1200 
group). For the panel of countries with income below $1200, per capita income is stagnant for 
the period 1970-2002 in spite of the positive growth rates of the period 1991-2002. The time 
trend is as strong as the population growth in connection with decreasing returns to scale. 
Together with the absence of Malthusian behaviour this seems to suggest a strong role for the 
population growth problem as seen by David Ricardo.       
 
1 Introduction 
There is a widespread view that history was not friendly to the ideas of Thomas Malthus (see 
Foley 2000). According to this view his ideas were relevant from year 1000 until about 1800 
but not thereafter (see van den Berg 2001). A closer look at the argument in both cases shows 
that the judgement is based on the use of data on the world level showing that there are 
positive growth rates in spite of population growth. However, the growth of per capita income 
may occur in the rich part of the world whereas the population growth may occur in the 
poorer part of the world. In this paper we want to test whether or not this judgement may turn 
out to be premature when we look at more disaggregated data and in particular those of low-
income countries. In section 2 we report Foley’s model and derive some (formally) special 
cases, which may be relevant for the world as a whole or for certain income groups. In section 
3 we provide a single equation estimate and population forecasts based on Foley’s model, 
which show quite realistic variants of the model in the sense that the model produces 
reasonable forecasts. In section 4 the model is estimated in its system form in order to get the 
information in regard to returns to scale and Malthusian behaviour. In section 5 we turn to van 
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den Berg’s argument and show that for three different levels of income in terms of constant 
1995 US dollars, two of which are estimates for income as of 1800, the percentage of 
countries below that value has not decreased since 1980. They are about stagnant in income 
per capita. Population growth may be one of the reasons. Moreover, the kernel density 
distribution for GDP per capita shows one peak at an almost constant level of per capita 
income of 1000 US dollar (1995) since 1960 and an increasing dispersion for countries with 
higher per capita income. These data all in all suggests that the group of 71 countries below 
$1200 (1995 dollars) was about stagnant in the period 1970-2002 in spite of positive growth 
rate for the period 1991-2002. Also for this group of countries we confirm Foley’s result of 
absence of Malthusian behaviour with decreasing returns of GDP per capita to population 
growth though. Section 6 summarizes and concludes that the population growth problem is 
still there in the way Ricardo saw it but Malthusian behaviour is not.      
FIGURE 1 OVER HERE 
 
2 Foley’s model and some special cases 
Foley’s (2000) model consists of two curves with inverted U-shape (see figure 1). Income per 
capita is a function of population with an inverted u-shape in the lower graph of figure 1, 
which we call the production function. In the upward sloping (Smithian) part we have 
increasing returns to population growth and in the downward sloping (Malthusian) part 
decreasing returns to population or labour. Changes in the population are an inverted u-shape 
function of income per capita in the upper part of figure 1. In the upward sloping, Malthusian 
part population varies positively with income, and in the downward sloping Smithian part 
population varies negatively with income. We call it the population growth curve.  
Together they work as follows. Select a value of the population. Then you find income per 
capita on the production function. With that income-per-capita value you go to the upper part 
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and find the change in population, which tells you in which direction to go from your initial 
value. At a fertility rate of f = 2 population is stationary by assumption. The figure, as drawn 
by Foley, has four steady states. If you choose one steady-state value, imagine you are a bit to 
the right of it, then population is larger and output per capita is larger if you are in the 
increasing returns part and lower if you are in the decreasing returns part. In the upper panel 
we have the change in the population, which is positive if f > 2 (dN > 0) or negative if f < 2 
(dN < 0). If population increases, the steady state from which you started is unstable and if it 
decreases it is stable. The steady states are characterized by indices M and S for ‘Malthusian’ 
and ‘Smithian’ as well as U and S for ‘unstable’ and ‘stable’. Foley looks at world data, which 
can be plotted in the part with increasing returns and falling fertility. The steady state, which 
is relevant for world data then is a stable Smithian one. Once the stable Smithian steady state 
is reached, GDP per capita stops growing and there is a constant population. This view 
resembles a class of growth models (see the survey by Schneider and Ziesemer 1995 and 
earlier contributions from the 1960s cited there) sometimes called semi-endogenous. The 
steady state in the decreasing returns part and the upward sloping fertility part is a stable 
Malthusian one. On the very left we have a Malthusian one, which is unstable because of the 
increasing returns to scale. The second Smithian steady state in the falling part of the fertility 
curve is unstable because of the decreasing returns to scale. Now we derive some special 
cases for a given population growth curve: 
Case 1: Productivity may be sufficiently low to let the Smithian steady states vanish. 
Case 2: In this case there exists no decreasing-returns-to-scale part. This assumption is 
plausible for the rich countries and for the world (as in Foley’s Loess fit regression), which 
are to some extent dominated by the rich countries, because the world as a whole has no signs 
of decreasing returns so far. Then the Malthusian, unstable steady state and the stable 
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Smithian one are still there. The other steady states are absent if the production function has 
no decreasing-returns-to-scale.   
Case 3: The increasing returns part is weak and the production function has x > 0 at N = 0. If 
this value of x is high enough, the Malthusian unstable steady state vanishes. If, in addition, 
there is no decreasing-returns part, there is only one (Smithian) steady state.    
Case 4: The production function has no increasing-returns-to-scale part. This assumption is a 
priori plausible for stagnant low-income and lower middle income countries. In this case the 
unstable, Smithian steady state and the stable Malthusian remain in the graph of figure 1. The 
two steady states more to the left vanish. 
The two graphs in Figure 1 can be formalized as two linear-quadratic functions. Note 
that f-2 in Foley’s model is not a percentage rate, but rather the change in population. 
Therefore we write the population growth curve as follows: 
 
2cybyadN −+=        (1) 
 
The production function is (according to the lower panel of Figure 1) 
 
2gNfNey −+=        (2) 
 
To both equations a time trend for historical shifts and a residual for econometric purposes 
can be added. Insertion of equation (2) into (1) yields a polynomial of the fourth degree: 
 
222 )()( gNfNecgNfNebadN −+−−++= = β0 + β1 N+ β2 N2 +β3 N3+ β4 N4 (3) 
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In principle such a polynomial can have four stationary values as Foley’s model has. 
Estimation of the function would reveal whether or not this is the case. This follows from 
getting signs for coefficients and plotting the estimated function. 
 In case 1, parameters e and f must be low. In case 2, c is zero or at least very low such 
that the linear part is dominating. In case 3, e must be sufficiently large to guarantee that 
x(N=0) > x(dN|f=2). In case 4, f would be zero.  
 Obviously, the special case of equation (3) of having only the linear part is Kremer’s 
(1993) model and the linear-quadratic part is the well-known Verhulst-Pearl equation (see 
Gandolfo 1996). Foley’s model extends of these cases by the terms with exponents three and 
four. The Verhulst-Pearl equation is of utmost importance here because of its well-known 
property to generate an unstable difference equation for parameters even if its continuous 
analogue is stable. This will turn out to be relevant for the forecasts below. 
 This is a very simple economic model. It has no physical or human capital or technical 
progress. In econometric terms we would therefore expect to have an omitted variable bias. 
The only justification for the simplicity we could think of then would be that it is producing 
good forecasts. These might indicate that the bias is small. Therefore we first focus on the 
forecasts.  
 Among the three classes of methods for the purpose of making population forecasts  - 
forecasting time trends of level or growth rate of population, historical analogy, and social 
and economic theory (Lee 1991) – the use of equations like (3) or special cases of it is a 
combination of using economic theory and forecasting. 
 
TABLE 1 OVER HERE 
 
3 Population forecasting with Foley’s model 
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We estimate equation (3) in the simple OLS mode. It is a differential equation and as such 
analysis of its stability is similar to a unit root test. We do not have the corresponding critical 
values for such analysis though.1 In order to correct for autocorrelation we have added lagged 
dependent variables but they were mostly insignificant. In order to correct for endogeneity we 
have tried lagged right-hand side variables as instruments added to the other regressors in the 
GMM mode but the results for the forecasts are worse than those used below. Following 
Giersbergen and de Beer (1997) it is assumed that there is a lag of two years before 
population change, dN, reacts to changes in income, y. The results of our estimates are 
summarized in Table 1. In these estimates all exponential terms are significant at least at the 
10% level and so is a squared time trend. However, when trying to run forecasts with these 
estimates it turns out that the difference equation is unstable, either because of the third (for 
high-income countries) or fourth exponent or because of the quadratic time trend. When 
dropping the terms causing instability, we get the regressions in Table 2. These estimates are 
still quite good in terms of significance, adjusted R-squared, absence of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity and the Ramsey RESET test. The major disadvantage compared to the 
estimates in Table 1 is the increased number of observations indicating parameter non-
constancy according to the one-step-forecast test and the n-step forecast test. The CUSUM of 
squares test is also worse. The forecasting results from these estimates are presented in the 
second but last line of Table 2 and in Figures A2-A6. The prediction for the world as a whole 
is 8.6 billion people. For high-income countries the prediction is 1.65 billion, for upper-
middle income countries .78 billion, for lower-middle-income countries (including China) 
2,76 billion and for lower income countries (including India) 5.3 or 4.3 for two different 
estimates (see Figures A6 and A7). These disaggregated predictions sum up to 10.5 or 9.5 
                                                 
1 Similar models are used for the analysis of diffusion processes for new goods. The differential equations used 
there differ from those in the standard unit root tests. Unit roots go unmentioned (see Putsis and Srinivasan 
(2000). The justification for this may be that these models imply a different assumption on the true model 
generating the variable. For these models critical values are available only in exceptional cases (see Lucke and 
Lüthkepool 2004).     
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billion people. The forecast statistics, such as the Theil coefficient, indicate that the forecasts 
are reasonably good. In particular, the covariance proportion of the mean squared error is in 
all case above .99 with a correspondingly low bias proportion and variance proportion. The 
number of observations indicating doubts on parameter constancy is a weak point. However, 
rather than complicating the model or the estimation method, it may be better to repeat the 
forecast every year. Given its simplicity, this requires very little effort. 
 
TABLE 2 OVER HERE 
 
 Our estimates are within the range of those obtained with other methods (see Table 3 
in billion). This shows that Foley’s model is useful for forecasts. In order to carry out the 
analysis in regard to the relevance of Malthus’ ideas, we will plot next the graphs of the 
estimated equations and relate them to the special cases discussed above. 
 
TABLE 3 OVER HERE 
 
 Figure A8 shows the plot of the regression used for population forecasting for the 
world in periods t = 0, 10, 100, 140 corresponding to the years 1960, 1970, 2060 and 2100. 
There are only two shifting or quasi steady states for given values of time. In spite of the time 
shift we will speak for simplicity of steady states. The one at a lower population is unstable 
and the other is stable. Over time the curve shifts upward. This might be due to technical 
progress, factor accumulation or other effects captured by the time trend. As a consequence 
the unstable steady state vanishes. Thus, here Foley is supported under the additional 
assumption of increasing returns: for the world as a whole history has no support for the ideas 
of Thomas Malthus, because the unstable steady state vanishes over time. The actual and 
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forecasted population data of 3.06, 3.68, 8.03, 8.59 billion people for 1960, 1970, 2060 and 
2100 indicate that the population is very close to the moving steady state. However, under 
either decreasing or increasing returns to scale the model has an unstable steady state to the 
left of the stable steady state. Without additional information we cannot know whether or not 
the stable one is the Smithian steady state.   
 The population growth curve for the high-income countries in Figure A9 looks very 
similar. The population numbers, H, for the years 1960, 1970, 2060 and 2100 are .6772, .758, 
1.37, 1.65 billion. In later years these numbers are fairly close to the moving steady state, but 
not in earlier years. One can take it from the World Development Indicators that (not shown) 
the fertility rate for these countries has fallen below the value of two in the beginning of the 
seventies. Not being in the steady state is probably due to immigration as far as population is 
concerned and to technical progress in regard to GDP per capita. Under increasing 
(decreasing) returns to scale therefore it is plausible that the lower, vanishing steady state is 
the unstable (stable) Malthusian one, whereas the one that is approached is the (un-)stable 
Smithian one. However, again we can decide on this only when having more information in 
regard to scale economies.  
 For the upper-middle income countries we find only one steady state shown in Figure 
A10. Depending on the returns to population we may either have a stable but shifting 
Malthusian or Smithian one. The population, U, in 1960, 1970, 2060 and 2100 is .236, .294, 
.784, and .931 billion.  
 For lower middle-income countries we find two steady states again in Figure A11. The 
unstable steady state is vanishing as the curve moves up over time. Population growth is quite 
high. China is part of this group. The population, M, in 1960, 1870, 2060 and 2100 is 1.1, 
1.35, 2.65, 2.76 billion, which is getting closer to the moving equilibrium.   
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    For low-income countries there is only one moving steady state in Figure A12. The 
population, L, in 1960, 1870, 2060 and 2100 is 1.01, 1.27, 4.4, 5.31 billion. These values are 
very close to the steady state. The shifting stable steady state is either a Malthusian one or a 
Smithian one, again depending on the returns to scale.      
         So far this section has shown that Foley’s model delivers reasonable forecasts and 
therefore may be useful in spite of the missing variables like physical and human capital. 
Next, we will estimate the model in its form with two equations in order to get the 
information on returns to scale. This will allow us to see whether or not Malthusian steady 
states and behaviour are irrelevant.   
    
4 A system estimation of Foley’s Model 
In this section we estimate equations (1) and (2) as a system. As all variables have unit roots 
and we assume that they are cointegrated2 we take first differences of the two equations and 
insert the lags of the level equations (1) and (2) for the lagged residual term and multiply it 
with a coefficient. This yields the following variant of an error-correction model.  
 
d(dN)) = c(9)*[d(N(-1)) - c(1) - c(2)*y(-3) - c(3)*(y(-3))2 - c(4)*t] + c(2)*d(y(-2))+c(3)*d(y(-2)2)+c(4) +u(t)  
 
d(y) = c(10)*[y(-1) - c(5) - c(6)*N(-1) - c(7)*(N(-1))2 - c(8)*t] + c(6)*d(N)+c(7)*d(N)2+c(8) +v(t)  
 
The c(i) are the regression coefficients, and ‘*‘ indicates a multiplication. The added residuals 
are u(t) and v(t). As all right-hand side variables are endogenous in the sense that a certain 
value of the residuals has an impact on the left-hand side variable and therefore on future 
values of the right-hand side variables, we use lagged regressors as instruments in a general 
method of moments (GMM) estimation. As the right-hand side has levels as well as first 
                                                 
2 As pointed out in the previous section we do not have the critical values for unit root and cointegration tests 
that would correspond to the Foley model.  
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differences of some of the regressors we have to take care of interdependences among them in 
order to avoid linear dependence among instruments. We can use either the levels or the first 
differences as instruments. We tried both and the results were almost identical. The estimation 
results are summarized in Tables 4 and 5 and are plotted in Figures A13-A16. 
 
TABLE 4 OVER HERE 
 
 For aggregate world data we find the result in column one of Table 4 and Figure A13. 
Time trends are highly insignificant and therefore have been dropped. As we will see below, 
the reason for this is that time trends of the population curve go into opposite directions in the 
groups with the different income levels and are positive for all productions functions but those 
of the low-income countries. The richer the countries according to the income classification 
the stronger the effect of the time trend (see Tables 4 and 5, coefficient c(8)). The population 
growth curve has the expected inverted u-shape. The production function has only the 
increasing returns part. By implication, there is an unstable Malthusian steady state and a 
stable Smithian one as Foley found it in his analysis. As the world is at higher population and 
income levels than the unstable steady state – in 2000 income per capita is 5640 constant 
1995 US$ and the population is above 6 billion – population would continue to grow until 
income is about $9000 and population to about 10 billion. These values are at the higher end 
of the population prediction of the previous section. The value of $5640 is on the falling part 
of the population growth curve and therefore there is no Malthusian behaviour – increasing 
population change as income is higher - on the world level anymore.   
 In Figure A14 the result for the high income countries is plotted from the estimate of 
column two of Table 4 for the years 1960, 2000, 2060, 2100. The population change is 
increasing in income, but the time trend is pulling the curve down. This result is in accordance 
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with recent literature arguing that it is not the income that reduces population growth but 
rather human capital formation and change in gender issues as captured by the time trend 
here. Children have positive income elasticity. The production function has a u-shaped form, 
but population is always to the left of the minimum of the curve: for the year 2000 we have N 
= .975 billion, x = 29200, dN > 0. By implication, we are in the Malthusian part of the fertility 
curve and the decreasing returns part of the production function. There are only Malthusian 
steady states. The relevant one to the left of the minimum of the production function is stable. 
However, the time trend shifts the population change curve down and the production function 
up. High-income countries therefore exhibit the classical constellation of time, or technical 
change and factor accumulation, versus decreasing returns and population growth, though 
under conditions of human capital formation. The time trend is strongly dominating the data. 
We feel that it is an open issue here whether or not the upward sloping part of the population 
growth curve has to be interpreted in the Malthusian spirit. It is equally plausible to argue that 
children are like a luxury good. This then should not be interpreted as Malthusian behaviour, 
in particular because the phenomenon does not appear in the estimated model for the other 
income groups.    
 For upper middle income countries the results are summarized in column 3 of Table 4 
and Figure A15. The production curve has decreasing returns to scale and the population 
curve has an inverted u-shape. A time trend shifts the population curve down and the 
production function upward. By implication, we have a shifting stable Malthusian steady state 
and an unstable Smithian one. For the year 2000 these countries are near the peak of the 
population curve with y = 4750 and N = .5 billion. Malthusian behaviour therefore is 
essentially absent. The shifting time trend is stronger than the forces of stability and again 
dominates the process ensuring the growth of this group. 
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TABLE 5 OVER HERE 
 
 For lower middle income countries the results are summarized in the first column of 
Table 5 and in Figure A16 for the years 1960 and 2000 only. Both curves are falling in the 
relevant range as we have y = 500 and 1400, and N = 1.01 and 2.5 billion in 1960 and 2000 
respectively. Therefore Malthusian behaviour is absent. The time trend shifts both curves up. 
The time trend therefore works in favour of per capita income growth and population growth 
works against it. As the data show the positive impact of the time trend on income is larger 
than that of population growth and these countries are growing in per capita terms. Part of this 
though is due to growth in China, which is included in this group. There is no steady state, not 
even in the shifting form.  
 The low-income countries differ from the lower middle-income group in that the time 
trend has no impact on the production function. The results are shown in the last column of 
Table 5 and in Figure A17. The production function does not shift and therefore is plotted 
only once. Both curves have inverted u-shape and therefore Figure A17 is the one that 
resembles Foley’s model most closely. The population growth curve for 1960 allows for 
constant populations at incomes of about $100 and $650 and in 2000 for $40 and $740. The 
income levels for 1960 exist on the production function and therefore all four steady states of 
Foley’s model as of Figure 1 exist. The maximum income of the production function is 
$735.85. By implication the Smithian steady states vanish through the shift in the population 
growth curve around the year 2000. In the year 2060 the Malthusian steady states have also 
vanished. Actually the prospects for the low-income countries are worse than Malthus 
thought. The population growth makes even a Malthusian steady state vanish. In the year 
2001 the income in this sample is at $480. This is in the falling part of the population growth 
curve. Therefore we again cannot find Malthusian behaviour. When population reaches a 
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value of 6.5 billion, the income per capita reaches a maximum and thereafter declines. This 
value of the population is higher than the one we predicted for 2100 in the previous section 
and therefore will be reached only after 2100. This is a long time to go and therefore there is a 
big chance that population growth may induce a structural break of our estimates, which may 
bring about technical change or stop the shift in the population growth curve. This caveat is an 
optimistic one. The pessimistic ones are that either no structural break comes about and 
population remains growing or the growth comes from India, which is in this country set. 
Therefore we go to search for a different classification of countries in the next section. Before 
doing so we present some results for Sub-Saharan Africa.  
For Sub-Saharan Africa the results are summarized in the last column of Table 5 and 
Figure A18. The figure resembles that of lower middle-income countries.3 There is no steady 
state and there is positive population growth with an upward shifting curve and there are 
decreasing returns in an upward shifting production function. Again the question is whether or 
not the time trend in the production function is able to outweigh the impact of population 
growth driving the economies into decreasing returns and decreasing per capita income. The 
data though are much less favourable than for lower middle-income countries. The Sub-
Sahara region has had positive growth rate for 1960-1974, then negative rates until 1994 and 
again positive ones in the most recent period. The average growth rate for the whole period is 
an insignificant one of .1%. By implication, the problem of population growth outweighing 
the time trend is clearly present in Sub-Saharan Africa although there is no steady state and 
the population change behaves essentially in a Smithian way as income decreases population 
growth.  
                                                 
3 Most countries are also in the low-income group. However, there are four countries with an income above 
$4000: Seychelles, South-Africa, Botswana, Mauritius and Gabon. They therefore belong to the group of upper-
middle income countries ($2936-9075). In the lower-middle income group ($735-2935) are Cote d’Ívoire, 
Namibia, Swaziland.  
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For the larger sets of countries the question now is whether or not the results for lower 
middle income countries are based on the performance of China and for low income countries 
on those for India and those for SSA embellished by their richer countries (see footnote 
above). In the classifications used so far we cannot reject Foley’s claim that history has been 
unfriendly to the ideas of Malthus in regard to Malthusian behaviour. But the problem of 
population pressure is still present for Sub-Saharan Africa but not for the larger groups 
including India and China. This can either be a consequence of the data or of the model. In 
this paper we keep sticking to the Foley’s model and continue investigating the data.     
TABLE 6 OVER HERE 
    
5 The empirical income stagnation of low and some lower middle-income countries 
For poor countries there is little doubt that population growth slows down GDP per capita 
growth whereas other factors enhance it. The crucial question in terms of finding the net 
effect therefore is to see how large the growth was and whether or not it was about zero for 
some countries. We plot the Kernel density estimates for GDP per capita first for a set of 
countries for which we have data since 1960 in A19 and in Figure A20 for all countries with 
data available in the respective years. The first approach follows a constant set of countries 
over time as suggested by Quah (1996) and the second looks at the updated distribution in 
each time period. The restricted data set confirms Quah’s twin peak result. In the unrestricted 
data set the second peak is somewhat diluted. Both Figures show that there is always a peak at 
around 1000 constant 1995 dollars. It is hard to detect growth of the big peak with the mere 
eye. The local minimum following the big peak moves to a value of $10000 during the 
decennia. By introspection we form the guess that there is little growth for countries below 
$1200. Moreover, van den Berg (2001) suggests that per capita income at the end of the 
Malthusian phase for the world at 1820 of at $651 according to Maddison (1995) or $250 
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from Pritchett (1997). In Table 6, in the left part, we present counts telling how many 
countries had per capita incomes below these three values of $250, $651, and $1200 in 1995 
dollars4. As the number of countries for which data are available is increasing too, we take 
these numbers as percentage of all countries for which data are available. The percentage of 
countries, which is below the two Malthusian values of $250 and $651, has not improved 
during the period 1975-2000. For our value of $1200 the percentage being above it has not 
improved since 1980. By and large the two descriptive methods of Figures A19 and A20 and 
Table 6 indicate that there may be a no-growth club of countries with incomes below $1200. 
For the year 2002 there are 71 countries with per capita income below $1200 (henceforth 
U1200). As India and China are among them we do not aggregate the data but rather consider 
a panel of countries, which give less weight to them. 
TABLE 7 OVER HERE 
 
In Table 7 we present the results from the regression of the log of the GDP per capita 
of the U1200 countries on a country-specific constant and a common time trend. The 
coefficient for the time trend is well known to be the average growth rate. It is positive for the 
whole period 1960-2002 but as small as .0034, which is less than a half percent. It is a half 
percent during the last dozen of years 1991-2002. For all other periods it is negative. In 
particular, for the period 1970-2002 the result from Table 6 is confirmed saying that there is 
negative growth for a period of 33 years, including the two oil crises, the lost decade 
following the 1981/82 debt crisis, and also including the period from 1991-2002 with positive 
                                                 
4 However, in Pritchett’s paper these are 1985 purchasing power equivalents, corresponding to $70 in 1985 
dollars. Even when transforming them into 1995 dollars there are only very few countries in that range. For our 
purpose of finding a set of countries with almost no growth we need a higher level. With about 9% of countries 
with data availability under $250 in 1995 dollars we do not want to go to lower levels with lower percentages. 
Maddison’s data were in 1990 dollars, which is a small difference and there is no need here to meet Maddison’s 
number exactly.   
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growth. This latter period does not compensate for the negative growth of the two previous 
decennia. 
TABLE 8 OVER HERE 
 
The results of a panel data estimate for the u1200 group are summarized in Table 8. It 
is a fixed effects estimate. The population change equation and the production function are 
estimated separately because the interdependence of the equation in the estimates for 
aggregated data was very weak when comparing least squares and SUR (seemingly unrelated 
regression) estimates, both not shown. Moreover, we do not use a common factor restriction 
and we estimate in the SUR method because adding instruments in GMM leads to a ‘near 
singular matrix warning’ and the SUR method makes sure that the residuals of the countries 
are not taken as independent but rather the population growth (and the production function, 
each separately) equations are allowed to have correlated error terms. For the population 
growth equation this is plausible in particular because of the aids epidemic, and for the 
production function because of the interrelated business cycles and growth processes. 
Moreover, in the estimation of the production function we can improve the estimate 
considerably by allowing for country-specific time trends. When having the estimation results 
we extract the coefficient of population and GDP per capita respectively as a common factor 
from the level variables, set the level term equal to zero and get the following equation in 
terms of the coefficients of Table 8: 
 
 2798000 -836.7945 0.357587 3688.020dN= + y+ y +  t
0.655752 0.655752 0.655752 0.655752
×  
 
-07 -16
237.62 7.05 10 3.39 10 .626x= - N+ N + t
0.083796 0.083796 0.083796 0.083796
× ×  
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     In these equations and in the plot in Figure A21 we use the average values of the fixed 
effects in both equations and of the time trends of the second equation. In Table 8 we have 
given the intervals in which they are in the estimates. Figure A21 shows that population 
behaviour in the u1200 group is essentially Smithian and there are decreasing returns to scale. 
Therefore Malthus’ idea does not come out here but the population problem is of course 
keeping growth down. The panel average of per capita income is y = $475 and N = 38mln, 
and for the years 2000-2002 they are y = $494 and N=52.5mln. The latter average number 
indicates that the 71 countries account for 3.5 billion people, which is more than half of the 
world population in the no growth club. However, once India and China are taken out the club 
size is 1 billion people. On the other hand then the income limit of $1200 might be larger as 
well. Again, an income change from $475 to $494 within twenty years (from the middle of 
the panel in 1981 to 2001 for the restricted panel with years 2000-2001, this is one dollar a 
year and 1/5th of a percent) confirms that there is little growth in GDP per capita but a high 
one in population growth. The prospects are of course worst for countries with negative time 
trends. The distribution of the coefficients of the time trend variable is plotted in A22. The 
countries with the negative time trends are: Bolivia, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo DR, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Gambia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, 
Kyrgyz Rep., Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Niger, Papua 
New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Island, Tajikistan, Togo, Vanuatu, West Bank and Gaza, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. This is roughly what you would expect and again confirms that Foley’s 
model is not only simple but also very realistic. 
   
6. Summary and conclusion 
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In section three, we have shown that Foley’s model produces reasonable forecasts for 
the population growth of the aggregated country groups according to the Worldbank income 
classification. In section four, we found plausible estimates of the two-equation system 
version of Foley’s model. Malthusian behaviour is hard to detect unless one accepts that it is 
present in high-income countries whereas it is clearly absent in all other groups of countries. 
An interpretation of children having a high-income elasticity, or, richer parents can afford to 
have more children, seems more plausible. Foley’s increasing returns result is found on the 
world level and for low-income countries. For the other group we find decreasing returns to 
population growth. As aggregate data include India in the low income group and China in the 
lower-middle income group one gets even the impression here that a problem of population 
growth is present only in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore we continue with even more 
disaggregated data. In section three we show that (i) the density distribution of world income 
has a stagnant peak around $1000 and (ii) that the percentage of countries that is below the 
income levels of $250 and $650 has not improved since 1975 and (iii) for the level of $1200 
there is stagnation since 1980. The suspicion that the u1200 group is a no growth club – with 
the exceptions of individual countries of course – is confirmed by panel regression analysis. 
For the period 1975-2002 the panel average growth rate is negative in spite of the fact that it 
is positive for the years 1991-2002. The estimation of Foley’s model for the u1200 group 
shows a curvature that resembles that of the lower middle-income countries and Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  However, the curves show lower population change and lower incomes because the 
large and rich countries get a higher weight in a panel compared to aggregated data. In the 
u1200 group Malthusian behaviour is absent, but population growth outweighs the growth 
effects of a positive time trend under conditions of decreasing returns to scale. This seems to 
be closer to Ricardo’s version of the population growth problem than to that of Malthus.     
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Table 1 Least squares estimation and test of Foley's Model  
Dependent variable: Population change    
Variable Group World HI UMI LMI LI 
       
constant  -4.26E+09 4.94E+09 1.29E+08 -3.19E+09 -5.93E+08
  (-9.757049) -(1.771745) -(7.412103) -(10.591800) -(4.615645)
Pop(-2)  3.934045 -25.69691 -1.507849 8.312608 1.647432
  (-9.839606) (-1.814914) (-7.361738) (-10.63889) (-4.656245) 
Pop(-2)2  -1.28E-09 4.98E-08 6.68E-09 -7.86E-09 -1.45E-09
  (-9.769586) (-1.858241) (-7.540755) (-10.57153) (-4.552366) 
Pop(-2)3  1.78E-19 -4.23E-17 -1.27E-17 3.25E-18 4.89E-19
  (-9.682538) (-1.893228) (-7.580521) -(10.508680)(-4.498179) 
Pop(-2)4  -9.77E-30 1.32E-26 8.73E-27 -5.15E-28 -6.68E-29
  (-9.695672) (-1.911164) (-7.507024) (-10.56836) (-4.506314) 
Time  - - -   
  - - -   
time 2  565861.7 33894.73- 172386.6 300334
  -(7.897) -(3.898) - -(7.583) -(4.500)
adjR 2  0.917279 0.729537 0.938222 0.839557 0.990539
JarqBera F-Prob 0.30501 0.225185 0.698856 0 0.011939
Breusch-Godf F-Prob 0.05774 (1) 0.0876 (1) 0.0404 (1) 0.840391 0.003307
White hetsc. F-Prob. 0.033589 0.796366 0.496954 0 0.030769
Ram. Res. T. F-Prob 0.002644(2) 0.13 (2) 0.0069730.129586(1) 0.060027(1) 
Cusum  5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Cusum squared  >5%(1990) >5% >5%(96-99) 5%>>5% 
No. Osf  4,<10% 5,<15% 4, <15% 4.<15% 11,<15% 
No. nsf  6, <15% 10<10% 15, <15% 4,<15% 30, <15% 
Legend: 
t-values according to the Newey-West HAC in parantheses   
Cusum (sq)     cumulated sum of (squared) residuals     
No. osf       Number of observations of one step forecast test doubting parameter constancy 
No. nsf       Number of observations of n step forecast test doubting parameter constancy 
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Table 2 Least squares estimation for forecasting with Foley's Model   
Dependent variable: Population change      
Variable Group World HI UMI LMI LI (1) LI (2) 
        
constant  -4.46E+08 -1.02E+08 1.99E+08 -5.37E+08 7.63E+08 3.95E+08
  -(1.218) -(1.583) -(5.986) -(1.401) (5.547) (2.642)
Pop(-2)  0.926109 0.355784 -1.347578 1.661487 -1.013044 -0.566764
  -(2.980) -(1.879) -(5.907) -(1.625) -(5.397) -(2.561)
Pop(-2)2  -4.31E-10 -2.84E-10 2.68E-09 -1.75E-09 2.90E-10 2.12E-10
  -(4.189) -(2.037) -(6.072) -(1.769) (5.154) (2.758)
Pop(-2)3  6.99E-20- -2.44E-18 7.65E-19 -5.37E-20 -3.58E-20
  -(4.534)- -(6.282) -(1.852) -(5.578) -(2.971)
Pop(-2)4  -4.11E-30- - -1.24E-28- - 
  -(4.806)- - -(1.939)- - 
Time  16900021- 2668011 2861633 13645096 6755729
  -(6.200)- (-5.87539) -(2.671) (5.667) (2.661)
time sq  - 14561.14- - 125761.1 
  - -(2.640)- - (3.923) 
d(po(-1))  - - - 0.406567-  
     -(3.771)-  
        
adjR 2  0.889969 0.689251 0.889939 0.879317 0.99237 0.986626
JarqBera F-Prob 0.302285 0.478301 0.785088 0.161876 0.000581 0
Breusch-Godf F-Prob 0.0000440.0112 (1) 0.0003940.098986 (1) 0.012136 (1) 0.001816(5) 
White hetsc. F-Prob. 0.167455 0.110201 0.000001 0.000001 0.087351 0.001636
Ram. Res. T. F-Prob (Nft) 0 (2) 0.0683 (1) 7.4E-05 (1) 0.01453 (2) 0.109457 (4) 0.000252(2) 
Cusum  5% (1993) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Cusum squared  >5% 5%>5% (81-99) >5% >5%(75-92) >5% (1975-92)
No. Osf  9, <15% 3, <10% 4, <5% 11, <15% 11, <10% 11, <10% 
No. nsf  23, bef.1995 2, 5% 29, <15% 17, bef.1988 25, <1% all,10% 
Pop 2100  8594022559 1653189186 779214678 2.76E+09 5.31E+09 4.29E+09
Sum Pop 2100 1.0502E+10with Li(1), or 9.48E+09with Li(2)   
Legend:  
t-values according to the Newey_West HAC in parantheses   
Cusum (sq)   cumulated sum of (squared) residuals     
No. osf   Number of observations of one step forecast test doubting parameter constancy  
No. nsf   Number of observations of n step forecast test doubting parameter constancy 
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Table 3 
Recent forecasts period  Forecasts from the 1980s for 2100  
UN  5.5-14  2100  UN 1983  7-14  
IIASA 9  2070  UN 1988  10.8 
Foley 7.5-8.5   2100  Worldbank 1988 10.5 
This paper: 
For aggregate world data 8.6;  
by Worldbank income groups 10.5 or 9.5  
 
Sources: Foley (2000) using Loess fits; Documents (2003); Lee (1991); this paper  
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Table 4 Results of System Regression  for High and Middle Income Countries 
Dependent variable: (First difference of) population change    
Coefficient      
(t-value) Variable\Group World (a) high inc. (b) upp.mid.inc. (c ) 
c(1) constant -8848829.00 6335751.00 -10132.10  
  -(.33) (6.18) -(.01)  
c(2) GDPpc(-2) 38782.64 237.60 3803.16  
  (3.87) (2.06) (7.32)  
c(3) (GDPpc(-2))2 -4.22 0.02 -0.43  
  -(4.44) (11.62) -(5.53)  
c(4) time - -508827.70 -49755.87  
   -(9.90) -(4.52)  
c(9) error corr.term -0.10 -0.81 -0.18  
  -(2.53) -(17.58) -(2.02)  
Dependent variable: (Change of) GDP pc     
c(5) constant 1048.29 98026.44 12555.69  
  (1.68) (2.73) (4.27)  
c(6) population 0.00 0.00 0.00  
  (2.78) -(2.13) -(3.24)  
c(7) Population 2 0.00 0.00 0.00  
  (.21) (1.31) -(2.26)  
c(8) time - 910.15 768.19  
   (8.45) (3.95)  
c(10) error corr.term -0.25 -0.16 -0.15  
  -(6.31) -(4.74) -(2.51)  
Adj. R2 0.11/.16 0.335/.075 0.07/.25  
DW  1.40/1.50 1.93/1.39 2.08/1.58  
J-statistic  0.254 0.281 0.205  
no.obs. = n   37/36 36/38 38/40  
nJ (1st eq.)<chi-sq.(d.f.),5%lev. (d) 37x.25<16(9)  36x.28<21(12) 38x.2<11(5)  
nJ (2nd eq.)<chi-sq.(d.f.),5%lev. 36x.25<18(10) 38x.28<21(12) 40x.2<11(5)  
       
(a) Instruments: 1st eq.: c d(N(-1)) y(-3) y(-3)2 d(y(-2)) d(y(-2)2)  d(N(-2)) d(y(-3)) d(y(-3)2) d(N(-3)) d(y(-4)) d(y(-4)2) d(N(-4))   
2nd eq.: c y(-1) N(-1) N(-1)2 d(N) d(N2) d(y(-3)) d(N(-2)) d(N(-2)2) d(y(-4)) d(N(-3)) d(N(-3)2) d(y(-5)) d(N(-4)) 
(b) Instruments: 1st eq.: c d(N(-1)) y(-3) y(-3)2 t d(y(-2)) d(y(-2)2) d(N(-2)) d(N(-3)) d(N(-4)) d(y(-3)) d(y(-3)2) d(y(-4)) d(y(-4)2) d(y(-
5)) d(y(-5) 2) 
2nd eq.: c y(-1) N(-1) N(-1)2 t d(N) d(N2) y(-2)  y(-3) y(-4) d(N(-1)) d((N(-1) )2) d(N(-2)) d((N(-2) )2) d(N(-3)) d((N(-3))2) 
(c ) Instruments: 1st eq.: c d(N(-1)) y(-3) y(-3)2 t d(y(-2)) d(y(-2)2) d(N(-2)) d(y(-3)) d(y(-3)2);  
2nd eq.: c y(-1) N(-1) N(-1)^2 t d(N) d(N2) y(-2) d(N(-1)) d((N(-1) )2) 
 (d) The number for the degrees of freedom is equal to the number of constraints in the equation plus the number of instruments 
going beyond the number of regressors.  
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Table 5       
Results of System Regression for lower middle and low income countries and Sub-Saharan Africa 
Dependent variable: (First difference of) population change     
Coefficient       
(t-value) Variable\Group low.mid.inc.(d) lower inc. (e) SSA (f)   
c(1) constant 153000000.00 -23788013.00 9475210.0   
  (1.85) -(3.48) (1.98)   
c(2) GDPpc(-2) -274399.90 281118.30 -18839.6   
  -(5.91) (7.62) -(1.21)   
c(3) (GDPpc(-2))2 140.18 -380.30 18.9   
  (6.17) -(11.22) (1.50)   
c(4) time 4815680.00 452914.40 267950.2   
  (1.57) (4.97) (48.37)   
c(9) error corr.term 0.04 -0.35 -0.5   
  (1.68) -(8.04) -(19.05)   
Dependent variable: (Change of) GDP pc      
c(5) constant 1898.40 30.54 2623.2   
  (2.29) (1.82) (46.71)   
c(6) population 0.00 0.00 0.0   
  -(1.69) (11.94) -(34.89)   
c(7) population2 0.00 0.00 0.0   
  -(.48) -(3.42) (33.48)   
c(8) time 68.01 - 80.7   
  (4.60)  (33.65)   
c(10) error corr.term -0.18 -0.41 -0.5   
  -(3.00) -(7.49) -(23.04)   
Adj. R2 .08/.096 .095/.14 .12/.31   
DW  1.26/1.09 1.4/1.35 1.67/1.40   
J-statistic  0.247 0.224 0.278   
no.obs. = n   33/35 37/38 35/37   
nJ (1st eq.)<chi-sq.(d.f.),5%lev (g) 33x.25<12.5(6) 37x.224<16.9(9) 35x.28<28(18)   
nJ (2nd eq.)<chi-sq.(d.f.),5%lev. 35x.25<12.5(6) 38x.224<19.6(11) 37x.28<28(18)   
 
(d) Instruments: 1st eq.: c d(N(-1)) y(-3) y(-3)2 t d(y(-2)) d(y(-2)2) d(N(-2)) d(y(-3)) d(y(-3) 2);  
2nd eq.: c y(-1) N(-1) N(-1)2 t d(N) d(N2) y(-2)  d(N(-1)) d((N(-1))2) 
(e) Instruments: 1st eq.: c d(N(-1)) y(-3) y(-3)2 t d(y(-2)) d(y(-2)2) d(N(-2)) y(-4) y(-4)2 d(N(-3)) y(-5) y(-5)2;  
2nd eq. : c y(-1) N(-1) N(-1)2 d(N) d(N2) y(-2) N(-2) N(-2)2 y(-3) N(-3) N(-3)2 y(-4) N(-4) N(-4)2  
(f) Instruments: 1st eq: c d(ssa(-1)) yssa(-3) yssa(-3)^2 t d(yssa(-2)) d(yssa(-2)^2)  d(ssa(-2)) d(yssa(-3)) d(yssa(-3)^2) d(ssa(-3)) 
d(yssa(-4)) d(yssa(-4)^2) d(ssa(-4)) d(yssa(-5)) d(yssa(-5)^2) d(ssa(-5)) d(yssa(-6)) d(yssa(-6)^2) d(ssa(-6)) d(yssa(-7)) d(yssa(-
7)^2)  
2nd eq.: c yssa(-1) ssa(-1) ssa(-1)^2 t d(ssa) d(ssa^2)  yssa(-2) d(ssa(-1)) d(ssa(-1)^2) yssa(-3) d(ssa(-2)) d(ssa(-2)^2) yssa(-4) 
d(ssa(-3)) d(ssa(-3)^2) yssa(-5) d(ssa(-4)) d(ssa(-4)^2) yssa(-6) d(ssa(-5)) d(ssa(-5)^2) 
(g) The number for the degrees of freedom is equal to the number of constraints in the equation plus the number of instruments 
going beyond the number of regressors.  
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Table 6          
Number of countries with GDP per capita (constant 
1995$) not higher than  
Percentage of countries with GDP 
per capita (a)  
year $250 $651 $1200 obs.available year < $250  < $651  < $1200 
1960 14 39 55 101 1960 0.138614 0.386138614 0.544554
1970 12 40 59 118 1970 0.101695 0.338983051 0.5
1973 11 37 54 120 1973 0.091667 0.308333333 0.45
1975 11 35 54 123 1975 0.089431 0.284552846 0.439024
1980 12 37 55 140 1980 0.085714 0.264285714 0.392857
1990 15 50 69 174 1990 0.086207 0.287356322 0.396552
2000 16 52 70 178 2000 0.089888 0.292134831 0.393258
Source:author's counts based on WDI 2003   
(a) Percentage of observations 
available. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Average growth rate of countries with GDP per capita below $1200(c)  
Period 1960-2002 1965-2002 1970-2002 1980-2002 1991-2002   
growth rate (a) 0.0034 0.00156 -0.0007 -0.0024 0.005    
(t-value) (b) 4.98 2.2 -1.09 -3.25 1.96    
adj.R-square 0.77 0.786 0.8 0.82 0.94    
Countries 71 71 71 71 71    
periods 43 38 33 28 12    
total obs. 2342 2147 1937 1712 845    
         
(a) The estimate is done with the fixed effect mode using country specific intercepts but a common 
coefficient for the time trend.  
(b) t-values are based on panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and the seemingly unrelated 
regression method (SUR).  
(c) 1995 dollars 
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Table 8      
Results of Panel Regressions for countries with GDP per capita below $1200 
Depend. variable: Change of Population change Change of GDP per capita   
 Coefficient  Coefficient   
Variable (t-value)  (t-value)   
      
constant (52e3,10e6)  constant (-863,1272)  
 all > 3     
d(pop(-1)) -0.66  GDPpc(-1) -0.083796  
 -(65.03)   -(29.08)  
GDPpc(-3) -836.79  pop(-1) -7.05E-07  
 -(66.70)   -(31.68)  
(GDPpc(-3)) 2 0.358  pop(-1)^2 3.39E-16  
 (66.07)   (33.34)  
time 3688.02  time (-32,24)  
 (65.99)     
d(GDPpc(-2)) -1090.212  d(pop) 3.16E-06  
 -(161.59)   (21.54)  
d((GDPpc(-2)) 2) 0.419  d(pop^2) -1.66E-15  
 (113.82)   -(20.30)  
      
Adj. R2 0.32   0.13  
DW 2.33   1.27  
no.obs. = n  2129 (40x71)  2171 (42x71)  
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
The theoretical income–fertility relation has both an upward sloping segment, corresponding to Malthus’ assumption of rising 
fertility with income, and a downward sloping segment, corresponding to the demographic transition in which fertility falls with income. 
There are two equilibrium levels of per-capita output, at which total fertility equals 2, the Malthusian equilibrium x , and the Smithian M 
equilibrium, x . 
 
 
 
When the population–per-capita output relation has both a rising portion, representing the effects of the division of labor, and a 
falling portion, representing the effects of diminishing returns, there are potentially two Malthusian and two Smithian equilibria. The 
low-population Malthusian equilibrium and the high-population Smithian equilibrium are unstable, while the low-population Smithian 
equilibrium and the high population Malthusian equilibrium are stable. 
Source: Foley 2000 
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Appendix: Figures 
 
 
 
Figure A2 World Population forecast    
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Figure A3 Population forecast high income countries   
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Figure A4 Population forecast Upper Middle Income Countries   
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Figure A5 Population Forecast Lower Middle Income Countries   
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Figure A6 Population Forecast Lower Income Countries, (1)   
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Figure A7 Population Forecast Lower Income Countries, (2)   
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Figure A8 
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Population for the world shifts upward according to Foley’s model. In 1960, 1970, 2060, and 
2100 the population levels are (predicted to be) 3.06, 3.68, 8.03, 8.59 billion people.  
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Figure A9 
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The population growth curve for the high-income countries has moved up and has become 
broader. The population in 1960, 1970, 2060 and 2100 is (predicted to be)  .6772, .758, 1.37, 
1.65 billion.  
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Figure A10  
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The population dynamics of upper middle-income countries has only one moving steady state 
shifting to the right. The population in 1960, 1970, 2060 and 2100 is (predicted to be)  .236, 
.294, .784, and .931 billion.  
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Figure A11 
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The population dynamics of the lower-middle-income countries has a stable and an unstable 
steady state. The whole curve shifts up over time. The population in 1960, 1870, 2060 and 
2100 is (predicted to be)  1.1, 1.35, 2.65, 2.76 billion.   
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Figure A12 
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For low-income countries there is only one moving steady state shifting to the right. The 
population in 1960, 1870, 2060 and 2100 is (predicted to be)  1.01, 1.27, 4.4, 5.31 billion.   
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Figure A13: Estimation for aggregate world data 
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For aggregate world data we find increasing returns to scale, an unstable Malthusian and a 
stable Smithian steady state and no time trends. Per capita income for 2000 is y= 4750.      
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Figure A14: High income countries in 1960, 2000, 2060, 2100 
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Figure A15: Upper middle income countries in 1960, 2000, 2060 and 2100 
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Figure A16: Lower middle income countries 1960, 2000 
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Figure A17: Low income countries in 1960, 2000, 2060, 2100. 
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Figure A18: Sub-Saharan Africa 1960, 2000, 2060 
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Figure A19: GDP Per Capita (constant 1995 US dollars) – restricted dataset 
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Figure A20: GDP Per Capita (constant 1995 US dollars) – unrestricted dataset 
0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
0.00025
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
GDP Per Capita 1960
Kernel Density (Epanechnikov, h = 1976.0)
0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
0 10000 20000 30000
GDP Per Capita 1970
Kernel Density (Epanechnikov, h = 2916.0)
0.00000
0.00002
0.00004
0.00006
0.00008
0.00010
0.00012
0.00014
0 10000 20000 30000 40000
GDP Per Capita 1980
Kernel Density (Epanechnikov, h = 3745.3)
0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
0 10000 20000 30000 40000
GDP Per Capita 1990
Kernel Density (Epanechnikov, h = 2608.3)
0.00000
0.00005
0.00010
0.00015
0.00020
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000
GDP Per Capita 2000
Kernel Density (Epanechnikov, h = 2586.9)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46
Figure A21: The U1200 group for 1960 and 2000 
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The plot of the panel estimate result of Foley’s model, for countries with GDP per capita 
below $1200 for the years 1960 and 2000, shows Smithian population behaviour and 
decreasing returns to scale. The panel average values are y = $475, N = 38mln., and, for the 
years 2000-2002, y=$494, N=52.5mln .   
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Figure A22: Distribution of coefficients of time shifts in the production function of the 
u1200 countries 
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